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1 
Who We Are 
This submission has been co-authored by students and the lecturer on the Ulster University 
Transitional Justice Institute taught postgraduate programme LLM Gender, Conflict and Human 
Rights. The programme focuses on the international legal framework for the protection of women’s 
human rights, in particular the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW, or ‘the Convention’), and modalities for ensuring effective domestic 
protection of women’s international human rights. Dr Catherine O’Rourke was a co-author of the 
initial submission to the CEDAW Committee (‘the Committee’) requesting an inquiry into access to 
abortion in Northern Ireland.  
 
This submission reflects the views of the named co-authors only and not of any institutions or 
organisations with whom any of the authors are affiliated.  
 
The Scope of the Submission 
This submission focuses on the issue of CEDAW compliance and ensuring that any new framework 
for abortion services in Northern Ireland is compliant with CEDAW, both in terms of the Committee’s 
specific recommendations to the UK government in its inquiry report, but also in terms of the 
principles the Committee has established more broadly concerning legal obligations on all state 
parties under the Convention. The CEDAW Committee has operated since 1982 to monitor state party 
compliance with the obligations under the Convention, and in this period has developed a substantive 
body of law detailing state party obligations in the provision of abortion services. Thus, the 
recommendations in paragraphs 85 and 86 of the CEDAW inquiry report on Northern Ireland can 
only be fully understood and appreciated in the context of the Committee’s broader activities and 
determinations concerning reproductive rights obligations under the Convention. Moreover, CEDAW 
belongs to a wider corpus of international human rights law. Consequently, in order to more fully 
elaborate state party obligations under CEDAW, where relevant and appropriate, we have drawn on 
other relevant human rights instruments to which the UK is also a state party. Finally, in some 
instances in which we have identified comparative practice in other jurisdiction of relevance for 
developing a CEDAW-compliant new legal framework for abortion services, we have included 
details also.    
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Question 1: Should the gestational limit for early terminations or pregnancy be: up to 12 weeks, 
up to 14 weeks, or other?  
Under CEDAW specifically, and international human rights law more broadly, there are a number of 
principles that should underpin legislation and policy on this question. The first principle is that 
women’s equality, dignity, and autonomy must be at the heart of the new legal framework for 
abortion. The CEDAW Committee has been explicit that the Convention: 
Require[s] all health services to be consistent with the human rights of women, including the 
rights to autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, informed consent and choice.1 
In order to comply, therefore, with the CEDAW inquiry report recommendations 85 and 86, every 
aspect of the new legal framework for abortion services in Northern Ireland must comply with this 
overriding obligation under CEDAW.  
The second, related, principle is CEDAW article 2(g) which requires state parties to repeal all national 
penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women. Under General Recommendation 
24, the CEDAW Committee is unequivocal that ‘laws that criminalize medical procedures only 
needed by women punish women who undergo those procedures [and constitute…] barriers to 
women’s access to appropriate health care’.2 Thus, the repeal of sections 58 and 59 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act  1861, in accordance with CEDAW inquiry report recommendation 85(a), is 
insufficient to ensure complete compliance with CEDAW. Any new legal framework must also 
eschew criminalization of abortion services that respect women’s right to informed consent.   
The third principle concerns CEDAW’s emphasis on not only de jure, but also de facto discriminatory 
laws, policies and practices.3 Thus it is not sufficient for the new legal framework only to establish 
 
 
1 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24, Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health) 
Adopted at the Twentieth Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, in 1999, UN Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I (hereafter CEDAW, GR24), paragraph 31(e).  
2 Ibid, paragraph 14.  
3 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) UNTS 1249 13, article 1, defines 
discrimination against women as ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
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lawful access to abortion services in Northern Ireland; the new legal framework must provide an 
enabling framework by which women and girls throughout Northern Ireland have consistent and 
effective access to those services. According to the CEDAW Committee:  
Acceptable services are those that are delivered in a way that ensures that a woman gives her 
fully informed consent, respects her dignity, guarantees her confidentiality and is sensitive to 
her needs and perspectives.4 
Barriers posed by real or perceived lack of confidentiality, stigma, resources, geography (in particular 
rural location), status as a minor, professional medical discretion or burdensome certification 
procedures constitute violations of the Convention and must therefore be proactively avoided.  
 
Question 2: Should a limited form of certification by a healthcare professional be required for 
early terminations of pregnancy? If no, what alternative approach would you suggest? 
Experience from other jurisdictions, such as Poland, evidences how such documentation and 
certification requirements can have a ‘chilling effect’ on both women and medical practitioners.5 We 
further note that CEDAW article 14, paragraph 2 (b), requires States parties to ensure access for rural 
 
 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field’. Further, 
CEDAW, article 2, obliges state parties to, inter alia: 
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to 
ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise; 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women. 
4 CEDAW, GR24, paragraph 22 
5 Tysiac v Poland, European Court of Human Rights Application No. 5410/03, 20 March 2007, 
paragraph 116. 
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women to adequate health-care facilities, including information, counselling and services in family 
planning.6 Given the large proportion of rural dwellers in Northern Ireland, we submit that it would 
be very difficult to require this form of certification whilst also ensuring the equal rights of rural 
women to abortion services. As such, we recommend against unnecessary certification.  
 
Question 3: Should the gestational time limit in circumstances where the continuance of the 
pregnancy would cause risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman 
or girl, or any existing children or her family, greater than the risk of terminating the preg-
nancy be: 21 weeks plus 6 days gestation; 23 weeks plus 6 days gestation, or other?  
In line with the information provided in response to Question 1, in order to ensure the fullest possible 
respect for women’s rights to equality, dignity, autonomy, choice and consent as articulated by the 
CEDAW Committee, the proposed time limits must be as long as possible.  
Also, in line with the information provided in response to Question 1, any new legal framework must 
also eschew the criminalization of abortion services on the basis of gestational time limits, where 
those abortions would otherwise be lawful.  
Further, in CEDAW article 12, which prohibits discrimination against women in accessing 
healthcare, the Convention includes a broad definition of ‘health’, to include both physical and mental 
health throughout the life cycle, and which is tailored to the diverse needs based on disability, age, 
socioeconomic status and other factors.7 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which monitors state compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
to which the UK is a state party, has determined that:  
Violations of women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights, such as forced sterilizations, 
forced abortion, forced pregnancy, criminalization of abortion, denial or delay of safe abortion 
and post-abortion care, forced continuation of pregnancy, abuse and mistreatment of women 
and girls seeking sexual and reproductive health information, goods and services, are forms 
 
 
6 CEDAW, GR24, paragraph 28.  
7 Ibid, paragraph 12.  
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of gender-based violence that, depending on the circumstances, may amount to torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.8  
We therefore submit that, in order to ensure CEDAW compliance, a broad definition of health must 
be applied, with a low threshold for potential risk of injury.    
 
Question 4: Should abortion without time limit be available for fetal abnormality where there 
is substantial risk that: the fetus would die in utero (in the womb) or shortly after birth; the 
fetus if born would suffer a severe impairment, including a mental or physical disability which 
is likely to significantly limit either the length or quality of the child’s life, or other?  
In recommendation 85(b)(iii) of the CEDAW inquiry report, the Committee required that provision 
for abortion on grounds of severe foetal impairment, including FFA, avoid ‘perpetuating stereotypes 
toward persons with disabilities and ensuring appropriate and ongoing support, social and financial, 
for women who decide to carry such pregnancies to term’. Consequently, in addressing this question, 
the submission draws also on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),9 
and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), two international human rights treaties 
also ratified by the UK.   
We note that the CRPD frames disability as an evolving concept which intersects persons with 
impairments and their societal environment. Further, it makes no explicit reference to abortion or 
pregnancy in the treaty text. However, in its work, the CRPD Committee has outlined a number of 
issues of relevance, in particular: 
 
 
8 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 12) ‘General Comment No. 22 
(2016) on the Right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, paragraph 18.  
 
9 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 24 January 2007, entered into force 
3 May 2008) A RES 61 106; Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, 
entered into force 2 September 1990) TS 1577; 
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1. The CRPD Committee states that 'laws which explicitly allow for abortion on the grounds of 
impairment violate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’.10 
2. The CRPD Committee views even FFA as a decision that is grounded in impairment. They 
highlight that the pre-natal assessment of impairment as non-exact and the assessment perpetuates 
stereotyping disability as 'incompatible with a good life’.11 
In light of this position of the CRPD Committee, in interpreting state party obligations under CRPD, 
we submit that the only feasible means for implementing recommendation 85(b)(iii) of the CEDAW 
inquiry report is to ensure a broad right of access to abortion services, in conjunction with an increase 
in practical and emotional support for parents with children with disabilities, as well as a move 
towards representation and normalisation of safe and accessible abortion services for women with 
disabilities. We further note that CRPD, article 25 obliges state parties to ensure the sexual and 
reproductive health of people with disabilities. We therefore further conclude that, in order for the 
new legal framework to comply with recommendation 85(b)(iii), the rights of women and girls with 
disabilities to make informed decisions about their own sexual and reproductive health must be 
protected and enforced.  
 
Comparative Practice in Other Jurisdictions 
In the Republic of Ireland, abortion is currently permitted in situations in which two medical 
practitioners are in agreement that a condition will lead to the death of the fetus within 28 days of 
birth. 12 
 
 
 
10 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 'Comments on the draft General Comment 
No 36 of the Human Rights Committee on article 6 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights’. Concluding Observations: Japan (2014), para. 13. Cf. Communication 684/1996 R.S. v 
Trinidad and Tobago, Views adopted on 2 April 2002, para. 7.2 
11 Ibid  
12 Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 (Republic of Ireland).  
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Question 5: Do you agree that provision should be made for abortions without gestational time 
limit where: there is a risk to the life of the woman or girl greater than if the pregnancy were 
terminated? If termination is necessary to prevent grave and/or permanent injury to the phys-
ical or mental health of the pregnant woman or girl? Or other?  
CEDAW article 12, which prohibits discrimination against women in accessing healthcare, adopts a 
broad definition of ‘health’, to include both physical and mental health throughout the life cycle, and 
which is tailored to the diverse needs of women and girls based on (dis)ability, age, socioeconomic 
status and other factors.13 Further, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
which monitors state compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights to which the UK is a state party, has determined that:  
Violations of women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights, such as forced sterilizations, 
forced abortion, forced pregnancy, criminalization of abortion, denial or delay of safe abortion 
and post-abortion care, forced continuation of pregnancy, abuse and mistreatment of women 
and girls seeking sexual and reproductive health information, goods and services, are forms 
of gender-based violence that, depending on the circumstances, may amount to torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.14  
We therefore submit that, in order to ensure CEDAW compliance, a broad definition of health must 
be applied, with an understanding of the fundamental interconnection of health and life, and with low 
threshold for potential risk to life. We further submit that, in line with principles enumerated in 
response to question 1, any mechanism for decision-making on this question must ensure that the 
pregnant woman’s dignity, autonomy, choice and informed consent is central.   
 
 
 
13 CEDAW, GR24, paragraph 12.  
14 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 12) ‘General Comment No. 22 
(2016) on the Right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, paragraph 18.  
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Question 6: Do you agree that a medical practitioner or another registered healthcare profes-
sional should be able to provide terminations provided they are appropriately trained and com-
petent to provide the treatment in accordance with their professional body’s requirements and 
guidelines?  
‘Safe abortion’ is an essential human right that should be respected, protected and fulfilled. As a 
positive right, states must ensure access to the highest attainable standard of abortion services,15 
which means guaranteeing trained personnel16 and a space with the appropriate conditions for 
performing it are available.17  
CEDAW and CESCR, through their general comments and recommendations, affirm the right (of 
women) to ‘the highest attainable standard of health’,18 and more specifically, ‘sexual and 
reproductive health’.19 Thus, whilst no human rights treaty provision specifies ‘who’ can perform an 
abortion, nor ‘where’, general principles are established which provide and important and useful 
framework for the new legal framework in Northern Ireland.  
We note that NICE Guidelines recommend against restricting the provision of abortion services to 
doctors, and recommend also the use of midwives and nurses.20 Further, human rights obligations as 
interpreted by CEDAW and CESCR Committees stipulate that services are applied by  ‘trained21 
 
 
15 CEDAW, article 12; CEDAW, GR24, paragraph 2; CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19, 
paragraph 7 (g); ICESCR, article 12; CESCR, General Comment No. 22, paragraph 11. 
16 CESCR, General Comment No. 22, paragraph 13. 
17 CEDAW, GR24, Recommendations government action (e). 
18 CEDAW, article 12; CEDAW, GR24, paragraph 2; CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19, 
paragraph 7 (g); ICESCR, article 12.   
19 CESCR, General Comment No. 22, paragraph 11. 
20 NICE guidelines recommend the use of nursing and midwifery staff (September 2019) and not just 
doctors; this is also recommended in World Health Organization Guidance.   
21 ‘Ensure that the training curricula of health workers include comprehensive, mandatory, gender-
sensitive courses on women’s health and human rights’, CEDAW, GR24, Recommendations 
government action (f). ‘Training health care providers’ regarding safe abortion, CESCR, General 
Comment No. 22, paragraph 28. 
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medical and professional personnel and skilled providers’.22 Furthermore, international human rights 
law requires an ‘adequate number of health-care providers’, in addition to requiring that health-care 
providers who ‘refuse to perform [abortion] services’ ensure ‘that women are referred to alternative 
health providers’.23 
Where an abortion is permitted, although international human rights law does not specify an explicit 
place (e.g. hospital, clinic or GP24), it can be identified as a space where the services are ‘consistent 
with the human rights of women, including the rights to autonomy, privacy, confidentiality, informed 
consent and choice’.25 It is also specified the need of safe abortion, which also emphasises on the 
quality of the services26 and the idea to put women at the centre.27 Moreover, the intersectionality 
perspective must be considered, taking into account the needs of particular groups such as persons 
with disabilities28 or the geographical barriers, for instance of rural women.29 Finally, the quality of 
the service must be ensured, without any distinction due to the facilities characteristic as public or 
 
 
22 CESCR, General Comment No. 22, paragraph 13. 
23 CEDAW, GR24 paragraph 11. Also, the ‘Termination of Pregnancy bill 2018’ part 2 ‘Registered 
health practitioner with conscientious objection’ mentions the responsibility of addressing to a 
‘another registered practitioner that does not have conscientious objection to the performance of the 
termination’. Available at < https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/bill.first/bill-2018-089?>.  
24 A debate about how ideal services could be in NI can be found in G Horgan A M Gray and L 
Morgan, ‘Developing Policy for a Full Reproductive Health Service in NI’ (2019) ARK Policy Brief 
7 
25 CEDAW, GR24, Recommendations government action (e).  
26 CESCR, General Comment No. 22, paragraph 28.  
27 ‘Perspective of women needs’, CEDAW, GR24, paragraph 11  
28 CESCR, General Comment No. 22, paragraph 24. Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, article 25.  
29 CEDAW, article 14, CEDAW, General Recommendation No.34; CESCR, General Comment No. 
22, paragraph 46. 
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private30-even though is important to put emphasis on ‘safe abortion’ as a matter of public health 
globally.31  
‘Who’ and ‘where’ abortion should be answered considering women human rights interdependence. 
The right to sexual and reproductive health is linked with the right to life,32 liberty and security of 
person and freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.33 In conclusion, 
the medical practice of abortion can be safe and reliable ‘when performed by skilled health care 
providers in sanitary conditions’. 34 
 
Question 7: Do you agree that the model of service delivery for Northern Ireland should provide 
for flexibility on where abortions procedures can take place and be able to be developed within 
Northern Ireland?  
Yes, for the principles enumerated in response to question 6.  
 
Question 8: Do you agree that terminations after 22/24 weeks should only be undertaken by 
health and social care provides within acute sector hospitals? 
The principles enumerated in response to question 6 should also frame legislation in this area.  
 
 
 
30 CESCR, General Comment No. 22, paragraph 42. 
31 SRHM, ‘Safe Abortion’ (2019), <http://www.srhm.org/safe-abortion/>; WHO, ‘Safe Abortion: 
technical and policy guidance for health systems’ (2edn World Health Organization 2012) 17. 
32 Alyne da Silva Pimenyel v. Brazil, CEDAW Committee Communication No. 17/2008, 10 August 
2011; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 (Article 6 of the ICCPR). 
33 Karen Noelia Llantoy Huaman v. Peru, Human Rights Committee Communication No. 1153/2003, 
24 October 2005, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003. 
34 ‘Abortions are one of the safest medical procedures available (while taken) by a trained health-care 
provider in sanitary conditions.’ Amnesty Intentional, ‘Key Facts on Abortion’ (2018) < 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/sexual-and-reproductive-rights/abortion-facts/>  
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Question 9: Do you think that a process of certification by two healthcare professionals should 
be put in place for abortions after 12/14 weeks gestation in Northern Ireland? Alternatively, do 
you think that a process of certification by only one healthcare professional is suitable in North-
ern Ireland for abortions after 12/14 weeks gestation? Or other?  
We endorse the principles enumerated in response to question 1 to frame the answer to this question. 
 
Questions 10: Do you consider a notification process should be put in place in Northern Ireland 
to provide scrutiny of the services provided, as well as ensuring data is available to provide 
transparency around access to services? Or other?  
We endorse the principles enumerated in response to question 1 to frame the answer to this question. 
 
Question 11: Do you agree that the proposed conscientious objection provision should reflect 
practice in the rest of the UK, covering participation in the whole course of treatment for the 
abortion, but not associated ancillary, administration or managerial tasks?  
Yes, subject to compliance with the obligations under CEDAW and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, as detailed in response to question 12.  
 
Question 12: Do you think that further objections or clarification regarding conscientious ob-
jection is required in the regulations? If yes, what additional measures?  
Conscientious objection (CO) has been defined as ‘the refusal to participate in an activity that an 
individual considers incompatible with his/her religious, moral, philosophical, or ethical beliefs’.35 
 
 
35 Wendy Chavkin, Laurel Swerdlow, and Jocelyn Fifield, ‘Regulation of Conscientious Objection to 
Abortion: An International Comparative Multiple-Case Study’ (2017) [Available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28630541 ] page 56. 
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This right is protected under international36  and domestic legal frameworks37. In the context of health 
care provision, the CO rights can act as a barrier to sexual and reproductive rights which are also 
protected under international legal instruments. In the UK, the elaborated standard for interpreting 
CO rights establishes that CO rights are qualified rights: whilst the right itself is absolute and requires 
protection by law, but its manifestation can be limited to prevent infringement on the rights of 
others.38  Consequently, legal frameworks must have adequate regulations that respects 
 
 
36 European Convention on Human Rights, article 9; see also Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch ‘Comprehensive Approach to Regulating Conscientious Objection in the Health Care 
Field Needed’ 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Statement%20by%20Amnesty%20Internati
onal%20and%20Human%20Rights%20Watch%20%20Comprehensive%20approach%20to%20reg
ulating%20conscientious%20objection.pdf. 
The right to freedom of conscience is recognized in multiple international treaties. See e.g. Article 1
8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Article 5 (d)(vii) (recogn
izing the right of nondiscrimination in the enjoyment of the right to freedom of conscience) of the I
nternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The ri
ght of conscientious objection as a derivative of the right to freedom of conscience has been recogni
zed by the Human Rights Committee, most often in reference to military service. UN Human Rights
 Committee, General Comment 22, Article 18: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and 
Religion, A/48/40 vol. I (1993) 208, paras. 11’ 
37 UK based protection of CO - The Abortion Act of 1967 (England, Scotland and Wales) Section 
4(1); Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, Section 38; Nursing and Midwifery Council, 
‘The Code of Professional standards of practice and behaviour for nurses, midwives and nursing 
associate’ Paragraph 4.4; Guidance General Medical Council (GMC) 2013 Paragraph 52, 54, 57, 59 
38  Janaway v Salford Health Authority (1988) (a secretary refused to type a letter which referred a 
patient to a consultant in regards termination of the client’s pregnancy on grounds of CO) Greater 
Glasgow Health Board v Doogan (Two midwives responsible for providing clinical leadership and 
operational management for delivery of the midwifery service within labour ward and obstetric 
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health/medical practitioners rights to CO at the same time ensuring that those rights do not serve as a 
barrier to women’s full enjoyment and exercise of sexual and reproductive rights.39   
 
Conscientious Objection under CEDAW 
International legal instruments and bodies have a clear position that the manifestation of CO rights is 
limited, and states have obligations to regulate its exercise. For example, the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, in its interpretation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child to which the UK is a 
state party, has determined that states should ensure that ‘adolescents are not deprived of any sexual 
and reproductive health information or services due to providers’ conscientious objections’.40 The 
CEDAW Committee, in its engagement with state parties to the Convention, has elaborated the 
following set of legal obligations on states regarding conscientious objection:  
1. A referral system must be put in place to ensure women access to alternative services where CO 
rights are exercised.41  Here the interpretation of limitations of CO set in Janaway v Salford Health 
Authority  and is a relevant guide for states in designing referral regulations as it relates to medical 
practitioners’ duty of referral. The UK courts have limited practitioners exercise of CO as it relates 
to referral;  
2. States are obligated to ensure that women are provided with information on available 
alternatives;42 
 
 
theatre refused to delegate , supervise or support staff on the labour ward directly involved with 
abortions on grounds of CO). 
39 See Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch statement on ‘Comprehensive Approach to 
Regulating Conscientious Objection in the Health Care Field Needed’. 
40   Information Series on SRHR available here:  
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/SexualHealth/INFO_Abortion_WEB.pdf 
General Comment 15, para. 69. 
41 CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24 Paragraph 11; CEDAW Committee, Concluding 
Observations: Slovakia, para. 43, UN Doc. A/63/38 (2008) 
42 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Hungary, para. 31, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/7-8 (2013) 
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3. That state must ensure conscientious objection remains a personal decision rather than an 
institutional practice;43  
4. The state must guarantee access to abortion in public hospitals.44  States are obligated to ensure 
that adequate services are available for referral and that non-objecting providers are available to 
carry out services.  
5. States should provide appropriate systems and mechanisms for patients’ timely referral to other 
health care providers in cases of conscientious objection.45 
6. Regulations on CO should clearly define CO and its corresponding legal obligations guided by 
principles of transparency and accountability which ensures redress to women that may be 
affected adversely when CO rights are exercised.46  
 
 
43 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Hungary, para. 31, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/7-8 (2013) 
44 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Croatia, para. 117, UN Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1 
(1998); Italy, para. 360, UN Doc. A/52/38/Rev.1 (1997) 
45 Concluding Observations: Poland, para. 28, UN Doc. E/C.12/POL/CO/5 (2009) 
46The UN CESCR has emphasized transparency and accountability, noting that that it is ’important 
to undertake  preventive, promotive and remedial action to shield women from the impact of […] n
orms that deny them their  full reproductive rights’. The Committee highlighted the importance of e
ffective judicial or other appropriate remedies for violations of the right to health. (United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural  Rights, General Comment General Comment 14, The
 right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Econo
mic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, paragraphs  21 and 59, available at: http:
//daccess‐ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/439/34/PDF/G0043934.pdf?OpenElement); 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, Anand Grover – Mission to Poland, 20 May 2010, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/14/20/Add.3,  paragraph 3, available at: http://daccess‐
ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/134/03/PDF/G1013403.pdf?OpenElement.  
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7. The exercise of CO rights must be adequately documented to support transparency and 
accountability;47 
8. Where a patient’s life or health is in danger, providers have an obligation to provide treatment, 
irrespective of conscientious objection.48  
 
Conscientious Objection to Abortion under the European Convention on Human Rights  
Given the significance of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the UK legal 
system, we further note that the Court has repeatedly found the unregulated practice of conscientious 
objection to be a violation of the Convention. In P and S v. Poland, a minor became pregnant as a 
result of rape. In keeping with Poland’s 1993 Abortion Act which provides the possibility of lawful 
abortion in certain narrowly defined situations such as if pregnancy is a result of a crime/rape the 
minor had right to a legal abortion. But in this case the minor faced many obstacles in accessing a 
legal abortion some of which included doctor’s refusal to perform the abortion on grounds of CO. 
The key issues  pertinent to CO before the court stemmed  from the applicants submission to the court 
that  the absence of a comprehensive legal framework governing the practice of conscientious 
objection and ensuring access to lawful termination of pregnancy in medical facilities had allowed 
the doctors to deny the minor her right to terminate her pregnancy in a respectful, dignified and timely 
manner.49 The facts show that after the minor had reported the rape incident at a public health centre 
in the area where she lived  in April of  2008 to  a time in May 2008 when the District Prosecutor 
officially certified that in keeping with the abortion act the minor’s pregnancy had resulted from 
unlawful sexual intercourse,50 the minor’s mother immediately requested  the local hospital for 
referral for a legal abortion in keeping with the abortion act. The doctors refused on grounds of CO, 
without the mother’s consent the minor was referred to a priest for counselling to change her mind 
about the abortion, the hospital provided inaccurate information about the requirements of a legal 
abortion and refused to refer to an adequate service provider. Another hospital was contacted but also 
 
 
47 Ibid, paragraph 52. 
48 Ibid, paragraph 50. 
49 P. and S. v. Poland, European Court of Human Rights Application no. 57375/08, paragraph 93. 
50 Ibid, paragraphs 5-10. 
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could not perform the abortion. And finally, in June 2008 through the Ministry of Health the abortion 
was administered in a town 500 kilometres away from the minor’s home town.51 Given that the 
abortion was administered, Poland claimed the legal conditions for a lawful abortion existed and the 
abortion was obtained hence the state fulfilled its obligations to Article 8 of the ECHR. Poland further 
argued that the doctors in exercise of their statutory CO rights provided for under Article 39 of the 
Doctor and Dentist Professions Act rightfully refused to perform the abortion but failed to refer in 
keeping with the act however, that error was a non-issue because eventually the abortion was obtained 
within the timeframe provided in the act.52   
The Principles established by the European Court of Human Rights to regulate Conscientious 
Objection:  
1. State has an obligation to Regulate CO: The court restated its judgment in R.R. v. Poland that 
once a state adopts laws allowing abortion, it is under obligation to design regulations that do not 
limit abortion.53  Further on CO, restating its interpretation of the word ‘practice’ used in Article 
9 § 1 of the ECHR  the court states that the word practice does not denote that each and every act 
or form of behaviour motivated or inspired by a religion or a belief  qualifies for absolute 
protection; that to regulate what practice mean in the health system Poland is obliged to organise 
its  health service system in such a way as to ensure that the effective exercise of freedom of 
conscience by health professionals in a professional context does not prevent patients from 
obtaining access to services to which they are entitled under the applicable legislation.54  
2. Obligation to mandate health practitioners to document refusal of CO and to refer patients 
to competent service providers:  Mechanism to regulate CO should include  elements allowing 
the right to conscientious objection to be reconciled with the patient’s interests, by making it 
mandatory for such refusals to be made in writing and included in the patient’s medical record 
 
 
51 Ibid, paragraphs 11- 41. 
52 Ibid, paragraph 92. 
53 Ibid, paragraph 110.  
54 Ibid, paragraph 106. 
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and, above all, by imposing on the doctor an obligation to refer the patient to another physician 
competent to carry out the same service.55 
3. Obligation to provide Information and act in a timely manner: The events surrounding the 
determination of the first applicant’s access to legal abortion were marred by procrastination, 
confusion and procedural gaps.56 Effective access to reliable information on the conditions for 
the availability of lawful abortion, and the relevant procedures to be followed, is directly relevant 
for the exercise of personal autonomy. It reiterates that the notion of private life within the 
meaning of Article 8 applies both to decisions to become and not to become a parent (Evans v. 
the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 71, ECHR 2007-I; R.R. v. Poland, cited above, § 180). 
The nature of the issues involved in a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy or not is such 
that the time factor is of critical importance. The procedures in place should therefore ensure that 
such decisions are taken in good time.57  
 
Comparative Practice in Other Jurisdictions 
Portugal: Portugal’s 2007 abortion laws is a good example as it limits the negative impact of 
‘conscientious objection’ on women. The law  allows  CO only those directly involved in providing 
abortion care; the provider who refuses must submit a written statement to their hospital director 
clarifying why they object and confirming their agreement to provide an abortion if necessary to save 
the woman’s life; must inform the patient and refer the patient to a non-objecting abortion provider; 
the national public health system in Portugal provides abortion services, and all gynaecological 
departments must have at least one doctor willing to perform abortion. These regulations have 
improved women’s access to abortion services though there are still gaps where in health worker may 
ignore the regulations.58 
 
 
55 Ibid, paragraph 107.  
56 Ibid, paragraph 108.  
57 Ibid, paragraph 111. 
58 See International Women Health Coalition report on CO , ‘Unconscionable: When Providers Deny 
Abortion Care’ available here https://iwhc.org/resources/unconscionable-when-providers-deny-
abortion-care/  
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Sweden, Iceland and Finland59 prohibit CO under any circumstances the refusal to treat patients, 
including the use of ‘conscientious objection’ in reproductive health care.  
 
England, Norway, and Portugal: A 2017 case study of regulation of Conscientious Objection to 
Abortion found that the England, Norway, and Portugal CO regulations shows the possibilities of 
balancing CO rights with ensuring women rights to abortion/reproductive rights. The report60 
identified three primary factors ‘necessary for a functional health system that guarantees access to 
abortion while still permitting CO’ namely:  clarity about who can object and to which components 
of care, ready access by mandating referral or establishing direct entry; and assurance of a functioning 
abortion service through direct provision or by contracting services.  The report also noted that social 
attitudes remain a barrier even in countries that have functional CO regulations.  
 
Question 13: Do you agree that there should be provision for power which allow for an exclu-
sion or safe zone to be put in place?  
Yes. 
  
Definitions 
1. Buffer, bubble, safe or exclusion zones have been defined as designated ‘protest-free zones’ that 
surround abortion clinics. Such exclusion zones are designed to ensure that those accessing or 
providing abortions are free from harassment, violence and intimidation from anti-choice 
protestors. These protest-free zones are also aimed at preventing abortion clinics from being 
vandalised and obstructed.  
 
 
59 Ibid 
60 Wendy Chavkin, Laurel Swerdlow, and Jocelyn Fifield, ‘Regulation of Conscientious Objection to 
Abortion: An International Comparative Multiple-Case Study’ (2017), available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28630541. 
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2. As noted by the National Abortion Federation (NAF), ‘Buffer zone laws limit how close 
demonstrators are allowed to be from a facility by requiring that protests occur at a specific 
distance from a facility. They are a proven way to balance the importance of safe access to 
reproductive health care facilities with the free speech rights of anti-choice individuals to 
distribute literature or engage in conversations with consenting parties’.61 
3. Jennifer Toussaint notes two types of buffer zones in the context of injunctions ruled by the 
Supreme Court in the US: ‘Floating buffer zones’ and ‘fixed buffer zones’.62 The term ‘floating 
buffer zones’ usually refer to protections around moving objects, such as cars and people heading 
towards abortion clinics, while the term ‘fixed buffer zones’ usually refers to the static area around 
an abortion clinic itself. 
 
The Northern Ireland Context  
The CEDAW inquiry report on abortion access in Northern Ireland addresses the issue of harassment 
and intimidation from anti-choice protesters. In paragraph 19, it is noted that, ‘The designated 
members learned that women’s access to legal abortion services in Northern Ireland was further 
impeded by the presence and actions of anti-abortion protesters stationed at entrances to public and 
private health facilities. The designated members witnessed protesters monitoring women entering 
and leaving a facility and displaying large, graphic posters of disfigured foetuses. The designated 
members heard testimony of protesters having chased women leaving the facilities, forcing plastic 
baby dolls into their arms and pro-life literature into their bags and pleading with them ‘not to murder 
their babies’. One facility has recruited escorts to shield clients from such aggressive behaviour. 
Although the police are frequently alerted to the situation, they rarely intervene.63 
 
 
61 National Abortion Federation, ‘Buffer Zones’ <https://prochoice.org/education-and-
advocacy/violence/buffer-zones/> accessed 2 December 2019. 
62 Jennifer N Toussaint, 'Abortion Protesting' (2007) 8 Geo J Gender & L 129. 
63 CEDAW Committee, ‘Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women’ (2018) CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1, paragraph 19. 
  
 
 
20 
Clinic chaperones at the Marie Stopes clinic in Belfast have also reported being called ‘child killers’ 
and ‘Satanists’ by protestors as they attempt to block clients entering clinics and play sounds of crying 
babies over loudspeakers.64 
 
The UK Context  
Ealing Safe Zone Court of Appeal Judgment: On 21 August 2019, the Court of Appeal upheld Ealing 
Council’s safe zone outside the Marie Stopes West London Centre in Ealing. A joint statement from 
the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (Bpas), Marie Stopes UK and Sister Supporter said this 
judgement makes ‘clear that harassing and intimidating activities and behaviours towards women 
outside an abortion clinic are not acceptable’.65 
Coalitions of charities are continuing to urge for safe zones across the country. In an October 2019 
press release, Bpas said, ‘A coalition of charities and medical bodies has today written to the Home 
Secretary Priti Patel to urge her to reconsider the case for buffer zones, amid serious concerns about 
the process that led her predecessor to reject them. In September 2018, the then-Home Secretary Sajid 
 
 
64 Cafolla (n 3). 
65 Marie Stopes UK, ‘Joint Statement - Clinics and Campaigners Welcome the Court of Appeal 
Judgment on Ealing Council’s Abortion Clinic Safe Zone’ (2019) 
<https://www.mariestopes.org.uk/news/ealing-safe-zone-court-of-appeal-judgment/> accessed 4 
December 2019. 
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Javid dismissed calls for buffer zones around abortion clinics following a public consultation’.66 FOI 
documents released in October address this issue.67  
Back off campaign: In response to the continued harassment of women and abortion clinic staff in 
the UK, a campaign was established called ‘Back Off’. The campaigners believe the UK needs 
‘specific legislation to ensure women can access pregnancy advice and abortion centres free from 
interference and intimidation, as has been enacted in other countries. We propose the establishment 
of ‘buffer’ or ‘access’ zones around registered pregnancy advisory bureaux and clinics, in which anti-
abortion activity cannot take place. This would stop activity taking place directly outside centres, 
ensure women are not approached unsolicited, and prevent other activities designed to cause distress 
– e.g. filming and strewing the pathway with pictures or models of foetuses.68 
 
Comparative Practice in Other Jurisdictions  
South Africa: The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 1996. Referred to by the Guttmacher 
Institute, a sexual and reproductive rights organisation, as ‘one of the most liberal abortion laws in 
the world,’69 this piece of legislation stipulates in Section 10 on Offences that, ‘Any person who 
prevents the lawful termination of a pregnancy, or who obstructs access to a facility for the 
 
 
66 British Pregnancy Advisory Service, ‘Charities call for urgent review of decision to reject buffer 
zones after evidence of women’s experience outside abortion clinics suppressed in flawed 
consultation’ (2019) <https://www.bpas.org/about-our-charity/press-office/press-releases/charities-
call-for-urgent-review-of-decision-to-reject-buffer-zones-after-evidence-of-women-s-experience-
outside-abortion-clinics-suppressed-in-flawed-consultation/> accessed 4 December 2019. 
67 Abortion Clinic Protest Review: Executive Summary <https://images.back-off.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/07113420/Home-Office-response-ANNEX-B-FOI-50345-Evidence-
pack.pdf> accessed 4 December 2019. 
68 Back Off campaign, ‘The campaign’ <https://back-off.org/the-campaign/> accessed 4 December 
2019. 
69 Frances A. Althaus, ‘Work in Progress: The Expansion of Access to Abortion Services in South 
Africa Following Legalization’ (2000) <https://www.guttmacher.org/journals/ipsrh/2000/06/work-
progress-expansion-access-abortion-services-south-africa-following> accessed 2 December 2019. 
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termination of a pregnancy shall be guilty of an offence. Such persons will be liable on conviction to 
a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years’.70 
 
The US: The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act. ‘Passed by the United States 
Congress and signed into law by President Bill Clinton in May 1994, [the act] makes it a crime to 
intentionally use force, the threat of force, or physical obstruction to injure, intimidate, interfere with, 
or attempt to injure, intimidate, or interfere with someone obtaining or providing reproductive health 
care services. FACE also includes penalties for anyone who intentionally damages or destroys a 
facility that provides reproductive health care services. Many states have enacted their own versions 
of FACE or similar statutes, allowing prosecutors to bring criminal or civil charges under state law, 
and giving providers broader opportunities for enforcement of the law.’71 
 
Australia: Safe Zone Legislation. Legislation providing for safe access zones around clinics which 
provide abortion services has been introduced in six Australian jurisdictions, namely: Tasmania, the 
Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, the Northern Territory, New South Wales and most recently 
Queensland.72 Sifric and Penovic note that after their research was published before abortion was 
decriminalised in Queensland, with safe zone legislation also being introduced in the state.  
(i) Tasmania: Tasmania was the first Australian state to introduce such legislation within the 
Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act.73 Sifric and Penovic note that, ‘The Tasmanian 
legislation prevents protesters from engaging in prohibited behaviour within 150 metres of a clinic at 
 
 
70 ‘Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 1996: Republic of South Africa’ (1997) 5 Reproductive 
Health Matters 116 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/S0968-8080%2897%2990013-
6?needAccess=true> accessed 4 December 2019. 
71 National Abortion Federation (n 1) 1. 
72 Ronli Sifris and Tania Penovic ‘Anti-Abortion Protest and the Effectiveness of Victoria’s Safe 
Access Zones: An Analysis’ (2017) 44 Monash University Law Review 317. 
<https://www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1730463/01_Sifris-and-Penovic.pdf> 
accessed 4 December 2019. 
73 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) ss 9(1)–(2). 
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which terminations are provided. Prohibited behaviour includes harassment, intimidation or 
obstruction of a person; visible anti-abortion protesting; footpath interference and recording a person 
entering premises at which terminations are provided. The penalty for engaging in prohibited 
behaviour within an access zone is a ‘[f]ine not exceeding 75 penalty units or imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 12 months, or both. In July 2016, John Graham Preston became the first protester 
to be convicted of violating the safe access zone provisions; he was fined $3,000 for protesting outside 
a Hobart clinic’.74  
(ii) Australian Capital Territory: ‘The ACT passed legislation in 2015 which amends the Health Act 
1993 (ACT) so as to introduce safe access zones. Like the Tasmanian legislation, the ACT provisions 
prohibit conduct including the harassment, intimidation and recording of women entering an 
‘approved medical facility’, and prevent anti-abortion protesting from taking place within the safe 
access zone. Unlike the Tasmanian legislation, the ACT law does not provide for a specific 
geographical zone but rather provides a minimum zone of 50 metres and leaves the maximum to the 
discretion of the Minister.75  
(iii) Victoria: ‘In November 2015, soon after the passage of the ACT legislation, Victoria passed the 
Public Health and Wellbeing Amendment (Safe Access Zones) Act which amends the Public Health 
and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) so as to provide for safe access zones around a clinic at which abortion 
services are provided.’76 The Victorian government in Australia said in 2018 that buffer zones around 
abortion clinics do not breach Australians’ right to free speech because anti-abortion protestors are 
not engaged in public debate when they demonstrate outside of clinics. Rather, their aim is to target 
vulnerable women for their healthcare choices and harassing staff at their place of work. The 
Victorian government made this statement in the aforementioned Attorney General submission to the 
Australian High Court.77 This submission came after Australian anti-choice protestor and religious 
 
 
74 Sifris and Penovic, ‘Anti-Abortion Protest and the Effectiveness of Victoria’s Safe Access Zones: 
An Analysis’ (2017) 44 Monash University Law Review 317, 318. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, 319. 
77 High Court of Australia, Melbourne Registry <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/cases/06-
Melbourne/m46-2018/Clubb-Edwards_AGVic.pdf> accessed 4 December 2019. 
  
 
 
24 
picketer Kathy Clubb was fined $5,000 for approaching a couple in a safe zone outside the East 
Melbourne Clinic.78 
(iv) Northern Territory: ‘The NT passed legislation in March 2017 which introduced safe access 
zones, decriminalised surgical abortions and legalised medical abortion. Like the Victorian and 
Tasmanian legislation, the safe access zone extends to the area ‘within 150 metres outside the 
boundary’18 of premises providing termination and the penalty for engaging in prohibited conduct 
within the zone is ‘100 penalty units or imprisonment for 12 months.’79  
(v) New South Wales: ‘The Public Health Amendment (Safe Access to Reproductive Health Clinics) 
Act 2018 (NSW) was enacted and commenced in June 2018. Like the Tasmanian, Victorian and NT 
legislation, it creates safe access zones of 150 metres around clinics at which abortions are provided 
and prohibits specified conduct within the radius of the zones.’80 (vi) Queensland: Abortion was 
recently decriminalised in Queensland, which saw the enactment of the Termination of Pregnancy 
Act 2018.81 The law stipulates provisions on prohibited conduct in safe access zones in Division 2 
Section 15 and 16. In Section 16, for example, it addresses restrictions on recording persons in or 
near termination centres and notes the penalty if such provisions are violated.   
 
Canada: Three provinces/territories in Canada have enacted local-level legislation pertaining to 
abortion buffer zones so far: (i) British Columbia: The Access to Abortion Services Act was enacted 
in September 1995 and aims to restrict protest activity outside abortion clinics in the province. The 
law addresses injunctions, arrests, offences and sentencing, recording outside clinics and activities 
 
 
78 Paul Karp, ‘Safe zones' around abortion clinics don't threaten free speech, Victoria says’ (2018)  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/18/safe-zones-around-abortion-clinics-dont-
threaten-free-speech-victoria-says> accessed 4 December 2019. 
79 Ibid, 320. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Termination of Pregnancy Act 2018 (QSL) s 15 -16. 
<https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/pdf/asmade/act-2018-023> accessed 4 December 2019.  
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restricted in safe zones.82 (ii) Ontario has a 50-metre fixed buffer zone for clinics that perform 
abortions in the province. The Safe Access to Abortion Services Act, 2017 stipulates provisions on 
what is prohibited outside abortion clinics in Ontario.83 (iii) Alberta: In April 2015, the province of 
Alberta introduced a bill for no-go zones around abortion clinics.  
 
CEDAW Committee: 
In addition to its recommendations in the CEDAW inquiry report on Northern Ireland, in its 
concluding observations to Australia, the CEDAW Committee recommends to the State party in 50(a) 
that it should: 
Implement the recommendation made by the Children’s Commissioner in 2017 to review state 
and territory laws, policies and practices to guarantee access to legal and prescribed abortion 
services and to raise awareness of sexual and reproductive health rights among women and 
girls, parents, teachers, medical professionals and the general public and create safe zones 
around abortion clinics.84 
Thus, it is the Committee’s position that such safe zones are required in order to guarantee effective 
access to abortion services.  
 
 
 
 
 
82 Access to Abortion Services [RSBC 1996] 
<http://www.bclaws.ca/EPLibraries/bclaws_new/document/ID/freeside/00_96001_01> accessed 4 
December 2019. 
83 Safe Access to Abortion Services Act, 2017 < https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/17s19> accessed 
4 December 2019. 
84 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘Concluding Observations 
Australia’ (2018) CEDAW/C/AUS/CO/8 paragraph 50(a). 
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Question 14: Do you consider that there should also be a power to designate a separate zone 
where protest can take place under certain conditions? If no, what alternative approach do you 
suggest?  
We note that freedom of assembly rights as guaranteed under the European Convention on Human 
Rights article 11 are not unqualified rights and can be restricted in order to, inter alia, to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others. As articulated in response to question 1, the new legal framework for 
abortion services in Northern Ireland must pursue to primary aim of protecting and ensuring the right 
of women to effective access to lawful abortion services. These principles apply likewise to the reg-
ulation of public space surrounding places where abortion services are provided.   
 
Question 15: Have you any other comments you wish to make about the proposed new legal 
framework for abortion services in Northern Ireland?  
CEDAW article 5 requires state parties to adopt measures to challenge discriminatory social and 
cultural patterns. In its broader activities under article 5, the Committee consistently draws attention 
to how discriminatory attitudes and stereotypes that regard women primarily as mothers underpin 
discriminatory laws, policies and practices in the denial of women’s rights to health, including 
reproductive health. More specifically, the CEDAW inquiry report on Northern Ireland in paragraph 
73 details how gender stereotypes across social, political and economic life ‘condone a culture of 
silence and stigma’ that prevent women’s access to rights guaranteed under CEDAW. The new legal 
framework, in order to be effective, must address not only legal and technical aspects of the provision 
of abortion services, but also commit to a process of public and professional education to challenge 
such discriminatory gender stereotypes. It is certain that the CEDAW Committee will raise this issue 
– and concerns about non-compliance – in further dealings with the UK Government.  
 
We further note that, in order to guarantee effective access to abortion services, the new legal 
framework will also require changes to legislation in cognate areas. Specifically, we note that abortion 
is also a workplace issue that will have implications for, for example, work absence and sick leave.  
CEDAW article 11 prohibits discrimination against women in employment, including the  
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, 
invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;  
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(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the 
safeguarding of the function of reproduction.  
These CEDAW provisions establish essential requirements for effective access to abortion in 
Northern Ireland.  
 
 
